Joseph Tabone. It just started flooding with everything. So now you were getting unassessed intelligence. You know, just about anything anyone said might be a threat". How appropriate is this quotation for the overall intelligence community, given the exponential expansion of open source information, and are intelligence agencies prone to a problem of information overload?
With the exponential growth of open source information, comes a huge problem of information overload which unless analyzed , correlated and dissminated properly, only serves to even further complicate matters by creating unneccessary noise.
Who is a purveyor of accurate information and who is simply repeating uninformed platitudes? Paul B. Colonel United States Army, D. This is all thanks to the advent of new and more sophisticated systems of surveillance and monitoring which are a direct result of huge advancements make by the technological community born out of the need for more, better, efficient, real time intelligence.
The faster and quicker the intelligence is gathered and analyzed, the better, as decisions can be timely made based on correct information. The major factor that distinguishes good information from bad information is the analyst. The Community could still collect "facts," but analysts had long ago been overwhelmed by the volume of available information and were no longer able to distinguish consistently between significant facts and background noise. Information was shared. It was separating noise from chaff.
Having so much intelligence at hand, the intelligence agencies across the world process each and every day massive amounts of information, across a very wide spectrum, from governments, to individuals and everything else in between.
However this does not always provide the ideal scenario, as these agencies are put under continuous stress, trying to achieve more but in fact achieving less as potential intelligence is not analyzed in time, due to amongst others, lack of trained and qualified personnel.
What is vital information to one is just data to another. Do we really want a world of better decisions but with fewer dick jokes? Just the thought of it keeps me up at night. This seems very strange to me. How many bridges were built by women? What percentage of engineers are women? How many Nobel prizes have been won by women? There are a few women who did. Women were held in the kitchen and the bedroom by men. But today they can build bridges or publish and they do so becaus we fought for our rights.
And we kick your asses. Stick around for a few years. If you were going to hire someone to build a bridge would you tend to chose one with several years of educational experience, or one without?
In Harvard accepted more women then men. Now that the playing field is beginning to level out I think you will be in for a big surprise. I contend this study does not mean women bring more intelligence to a group, but rather that men act differently in the presence of women.
It probably has to do with the competitive nature of males, either by increasing it and the result being a more intelligent idea or by calming the competitive nature. I only base this off of my own experience ofmale group dynamics, ive seen lots of really stupid ideas go through because of it. But in fact Woolley says clearly that the results are not explained by gender but by differences in social sensitivity.
Also, you could expect that this trait could be highly influenced by upbringing and culture. This intelligence enables you to objectively reflect upon your own thinking and behavior, learn from that reflection, seek future self-improvement, and establish inner self-confidence. Linguistic Intelligence includes the ability to understand and use language effectively in reading, writing, speaking, and other symbolic forms, such as sign language and Braille. It also affects vocabulary and the ability to recognize and use humor, create verbal images, understand language patterns, and recognize relationships between words.
Logical-Mathematical Intelligence includes a good ability to reason inductively make conclusions based on observations and deductively make conclusions based on hypotheses.
What the enemy tries to hide in this type of action is his sponsorship or other involvement. The goal of the CI service is to learn everything it can about these two kinds of inimical action, and therefore about the people carrying out the action, without letting these persons become aware that the service is acquiring such information.
Only by making available to the government information about its enemies which is complete enough to include all essentials and which was acquired secretly, so that the enemies remain unwarned, can the counterintelligence service do the task for which it was created and designed.
No counterintelligence service can do its job alone. The Communist services and parties are world-wide organizations which operate from Free Country "A" against Free Country "B," from "B" against "C" or "C," "D," and "E" moving so fluidly across and over national borders that a defense which stops at the borders will lose its war.
Therefore the service must have a close working relationship with other organizations, domestic and foreign, which can help it. The domestic departments and agencies most likely to have functions of counterintelligence significance are to be found in the executive and legislative branches of the government and in the intelligence components of the armed forces. The service also needs the cooperation of the citizenry.
Within the legislative branch of government there may be various committees also concerned with the country's security, and especially with its defenses against subversion. The service will find it profitable to maintain a liaison relationship with such groups.
The counterintelligence service will also need to maintain liaison with other friendly services concerned with foreign collection as well as counterintelligence. Collaboration with services in the former category is useful because they sometimes acquire counterintelligence as a by-product of positive operations.
Moreover, their primary targets in and outside the host country are representatives and installations of Communist states. They thus share with the defenders of the country's security a solid common interest.
The Communist services persistently use diplomatic, commercial, journalistic, and other representations for cover. By working with non-Communist espionage services attacking these targets, the CI service affords the foreign service added protection and acquires useful information in exchange.
The need for liaison with foreign counterintelligence services is obvious. Exchanging counterintelligence information freely within the wide limits imposed by national considerations is the only way in which the CI service can cope with an attack so varied, persistent, and intense that no service could hope to deal with it in isolation.
The information that can be obtained about hostile case officer "X" during his tour of duty is not likely to since for the purposes of negating his efforts or, better, recruiting him. These goals require all the information about him which has been obtained during his total time outside his Communist homeland—in other words, the help of all other non-Communist counterintelligence services.
For these reasons the liaison branch is an important part of the CI service. Its structure and its place in the service as a whole are discussed below.
The service will nevertheless have to get most of the information that it needs through its own resources and methods. Some countries may from time to time be faced by a significant clandestine or covert threat which is non-Communist in nature for example, a hostile non-Communist neighboring country, a Fascist group inside the country, a non-Communist opposition plotting to seize control of the government by force.
The service then sets up a corresponding group or branch which studies the nature of the threat, acquires expertise, and uses it to infiltrate the opposition or otherwise negate or control it. But when we consider the Free World as a whole, the non-Communist threat is dwarfed by the danger of Communist activity. So much of the service's energy and time must be devoted to the principal adversary that it would be wrong to set up a Communist intelligence services branch or a Communist parties branch within the counterintelligence service.
The service as a whole should be permeated with knowledge, skill, and a determination focussing on the chief target. The service will rely upon clandestine methods to obtain its information about the adversary for the reason already given: to keep him from knowing what it knows. It will therefore need an operations branch, which consists of specialists in clandestine methods. One element of the operations branch should be concerned with planning future operations.
That part of counterintelligence which is essentially security work will be timed, for the most part, in response to adversary initiative. For example, a hostile service tries to recruit a local citizen as an agent; a microphone is discovered in the foreign ministry; or a pro-Communist radio broadcast is suspected of having been instigated by the KGB.
Responses to these kinds of challenge cannot be planned in advance. Counterespionage, on the contrary, secures the initiative for the CI service and is therefore the activity with which the plans group is chiefly concerned.
It also plans for non-CE opportunities that will inevitably arise from adversary initiative or by chance, from deception operations, for example, or an unexpected walk-in. Finally, the plans group should be available for consultation with any national service planning an espionage or other non-CI operation and wishing to avail itself of counterintelligence expertise in planning for the security of the operation at the outset. Under the command of the chief of operations there should also be a group concerned with technical services.
Counterintelligence relies heavily upon the various forms of surveillance. Foot surveillance teams may need radio equipment, purchased or built by the technical services group. The same is true for vehicular surveillance. All audio operations, microphone or transmitter, require equipment and expertise. It may for instance be useful to have a double agent record a conversation with an opposition case officer.
Similarly, clandestine photography is often used in counterintelligence work. A technical capability to monitor all kinds of clandestine communications, including radio, and to analyze suspicious documentation, is also essential. Moreover, countering the technical attack of adversary services is a separate, though closely related, specialty. The CI service, accordingly, will need a group of scientific experts capable of understanding all the technical equipment used in modern CI, to the point of building such equipment if it is not available or cannot be bought securely; of installing and maintaining it; of training others in its use; and of anticipating needs through a research and development program.
An able technical services group is just as important in an agrarian country as in a complex, highly developed nation, because the adversary will press the technological attack regardless of the environment.
The group is logically subordinate to the chief of operations because technology and operations should go hand-in-hand. An independent technical group responsive only to the chief of the service might too easily lose touch with pragmatic operational needs. Placing the chief of operations in charge of the technical services group will ensure that this does not happen, and that he becomes familiar with the help that science can provide and stays abreast of current developments.
No national CI service can afford to be wholly dependent upon cooperative foreign services for the acquisition of counterintelligence abroad, nor can it wait until the enemy is inside the nation's frontiers before it begins to study him.
The solution is the recruitment of certain carefully chosen citizens, from government or outside it, who spend significant amounts of time in Communist countries. These persons are likely to have contact with the C1 services of such countries of temporary residence: diplomats who have social contact, for example, or industrialists in whom a Communist service might reasonably be expected to take an operational interest. Such persons must be carefully screened before recruitment. Normally, they are told to remain passive, neither accepting nor rebuffing hostile offers on their own but reporting approaches immediately and following instructions thereafter.
The CI service may also arrange to have one of its members stationed in each of the maim embassies of its country, as security officer or in some other suitable post. Such representation is valuable for the conduct of liaison with other counterintelligence services and also for investigations conducted in areas where the home country is especially vulnerable to clandestine attack. Direct representation abroad will, however, create difficulties for an internal counterintelligence service unless there is careful planning and meticulous prior coordination with other national elements represented in the same country—the foreign service, for example, and certainly the foreign ministry.
Care must also be taken not to offend the host service or government. Persons in the first category recruits rather than staff members of the service should be important enough so that the adversary service will take them seriously and assign senior personnel to recruiting and managing them, but they should not usually have access to important national secrets unless that access can be concealed indefinitely from the adversary.
The operations branch should also have an operating group with separate sub-groups allocated upon either a geographical or a functional basis. This branch runs the operations: surveillance and countersurveillance, penetrations, provocations, double-agent operations, technical and counter-technical operations, counterintelligence interrogations and debriefings, handling of walk-ins and defectors, joint operations with liaison, and so on. It is the largest component of the service.
If the country and its service are large, it is suggested that a geographic organization will prove preferable, because this kind of structure will permit appropriate grouping of language skills and area knowledge.
If the service is small or has few language and area specialists at its command, a functional arrangement may be better. In this event the operations branch will need a minimum of four groups or subgroups, for counter-espionage, counter-subversion, counter-propaganda, and operational security.
Thus, counter-espionage conducts all operations directed against hostile foreign services engaging in positive or counterintelligence activity in the country. Counter-subversion carries out all operations aimed against subversive activity; its principal target will be the local Communist party and international Communism. Counter-propaganda will monitor and control those propaganda activities directed from concealment against the national interests by foreign services or by local or foreign Communist parties.
The key words here are "from concealment. But if sponsorship is concealed, the government must depend upon its CI service to ferret it out and expose it, suppress it, or otherwise manipulate it so that it cannot harm the national interest. Finally, operational security works closely with the plans group and with other operational elements to ensure that the service's clandestine activity is properly hidden from the outset and stays that way.
The second unit may be called Research, Records, and Reports The CI service must grow in knowledge and capability; it is the function of the RRR component to see that it does so. As more and more is learned about the adversaries, the information is funneled into RRR, where it is organized, studied, recorded systematically, filed and retrieved, and used to produce the finished counterintelligence which Operations needs in order to work intelligently.Jun 18, · Practical intelligence involves the ability to deal with daily tasks in the real world. You can call it “street smarts” that show how well a person relates to the external environment.